AHRAR National Liberal Party
OpinionBy كاثرين بابادوبولوMachine translated from ArabicRead the Arabic original

« Rouge ou Noir ? »

Lebanon's Oldest Gamble Is Cast Once Again

By Catherine Papadopoulou

Secretary for External Relations and Expatriates and Head of the Federal Committee in the National Liberal Party

When President Trump told reporters on the sidelines of the G7 summit on June 16 that he had advised Israel to "let Syria take care of Hezbollah" because Damascus "would do the job better," he was not improvising. He had floated the same idea earlier. U.S. envoy Tom Barrack was the first to hint at it, warning in December that Lebanon risked being "re-annexed" to Syria if it did not disarm Hezbollah, a statement that Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri angrily rejected. By March, reports circulated that Washington was privately urging Damascus to send troops into eastern Lebanon.

In fact, this proposal, even if recast in new wording, revives an old dilemma in Lebanon's modern history.

In 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon to expel the Palestine Liberation Organization, and came close to securing a peace. The May 17, 1983 agreement, sponsored by Washington under President Amin Gemayel, would have normalized relations and brought Israeli soldiers home. But Beirut, under Syrian pressure and weakened by its own divisions, cancelled it within a year. The space that Lebanon refused to fill by itself, of its own free will, was filled instead: Syrian forces, present in the country since 1976, settled in for nearly three decades and left only when forced out in 2005. Israel, for its part, kept a "security belt" in the south until 2000, then withdrew abruptly, causing the collapse of the South Lebanon Army and emptying Marjayoun of families linked to it overnight. The Metn remembers the Syrians in one way, and the South remembers the Israelis in another. But the lesson taught by both occupations is the same. Horror vacui: nature abhors a vacuum. A sovereignty that Lebanon refuses to exercise and a decision that it refuses to take are a void that others will fill and occupy.

This is the lesson being tested today for the third time, and Hezbollah is the cause. From a secret militia in the late 1980s, the Party turned into a self-standing military force that outguns the state, then into a political bloc that governed through the "Shiite Duo," Amal and Hezbollah, along with its Aounist allies and a puppet presidency, then into a weight that helped sink the economy, and finally into a parallel authority running networks that smuggle weapons, fuel, captagon and human beings. As for successive governments, the Mikati government and then the wider establishment, they preferred appeasement to confrontation.

That was until Hezbollah miscalculated. On October 8, 2023, the Party opened a "support front" for Gaza. It did not foresee where this would lead: the killing of its Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah in September 2024, the killing of his anticipated successor Hashem Safieddine weeks later, the killing of a large part of its senior leadership, then a war that exhausted the Party, and a truce in November 2024 that left it drained and exposed. For the first time, not only Israel but most of the West began treating it as a threat to be dismantled, not contained.

In that breach, a new president stepped in. In his oath-of-office speech on January 9, 2025, General Joseph Aoun pledged to restrict arms to the hands of the state, and the government of Prime Minister Nawaf Salam adopted this principle. In August, the government tasked the army with drawing up a disarmament plan, and in September Army Commander General Rodolphe Haykal presented the "Homeland Shield" plan, a five-phase roadmap starting south of the Litani. By January 2026, the army announced that the first phase was largely completed; by February, the government set a four-month deadline for the second phase. But Hezbollah flatly rejected the deadline, insisting that the ceasefire applies only south of the Litani.

The plan stumbled where every Lebanese plan stumbles: at the line between intention and implementation, between capacity and incapacity. And Israel, unconvinced, resumed its incursion into the South and then deepened it, reaching a depth it had not reached since 2000. Direct Lebanese–Israeli negotiations began in Washington in April 2026, the first since 1983, with Beirut asking for a ceasefire and a withdrawal while Israel demands disarmament first. The negotiations are stalled, and Lebanon's own evasiveness is a major reason: it negotiates while refusing to confront the Party at home. Once again, intention, and an inability to move forward.

It is in this context that Trump's remark comes. Read in good faith, it was an offer about sovereignty: decide for yourselves, whether peace with Israel or a Syrian hand cleaning up the Bekaa and northern Lebanon, indeed cleaning all of Lebanon of Hezbollah, as he said yesterday, because both roads end with the disappearance of the Party's arsenal. Read at face value, it was a punch at Netanyahu over civilian casualties, while Damascus keeps repeating that it has no intention of crossing the border. Read in depth, it was a final call before the dice are thrown; and the choice may thus be more rhetorical than real, which raises the stakes. In either case, the vacuum will be filled. And what the South and the Bekaa remember is how long these guests linger before leaving.

Still, the gamble remains. Rouge ou noir. Red or black. Peace with Israel, or the return of the Syrians.

Your Excellency President Aoun, Prime Minister Salam, Mr. Speaker Berri, honorable Members of Parliament, and esteemed party leaders: on either color the stake is the same, and on both, the first thing the bank collects is Hezbollah's weapons. The only question Lebanon has never dared to answer is this: will it place the bet itself and win the jackpot, or wait, as it did in 1983, for someone else to place it?

Some risks are not worth taking.

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